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SOME HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE JACKSONIAN
PERIOD UNTIL 1945
I
"The true point of view in the history of our nation 
is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West,"^ The 
growth of the West, according to Frederick Jackson Turner, 
not only is vital to the understanding of democratic America; 
but is specifically contributed to the triumph of Andrew 
Jackson in the presidential election of 1828,
Turner’s argument revolves around three aspects: 
namely, the philosophy and practices of individualism, the 
evolution of political democracy and the development of 
sectionalism.
A, Stark individualism and love of equality were 
the characteristics of the Western settlers. It was not 
only a society in which the love of equality was dominant; 
it was also a competitive society. A man was deemed a man 
if he could survive the struggle for existence, irrespective 
of his social background; and the land was so abundant that 
every man might attain a position of economic independence. 
Political equality was thus based upon a real equality, free 
from the influence of European ideas and institutions. "It 
sought rather to express itself by choosing a man of the
^Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier In American History. 
(New York, 1920), p. 3.
2
people, than by the formation of elaborate governmental 
institutions.**^ Because of these elements of individual­
istic competition, leadership easily developed. And after 
the war of 1812, Andrew Jackson became the leader of the 
American people. He became the hero of the Mississippi 
Valley, the syWbol of their vague aspirations.
B, The irrepressible desire of the common man for 
political self-expression led to many radical changes in 
political concept and practice in these years. A natural 
result was the liberation of the suffrage. The new Western 
regions came into the Union as self-expressed democracies. 
Few states held out against this trend; in most, all adult 
white males were given the right to vote; and everywhere, 
too, the principle was rapidly being accepted that repre­
sentation should be based upon population and not upon 
property. This marked a revolt, characteristic of the 
period, against the idea that property alone entitled a 
person to voting or office holding. By 1830 only a few 
states held to the old practice. Indeed, the principle of 
popular election was even applied to the judges of the state 
courts.
While the vote passed down to the people, the popula­
tion in the West was also rapidly increasing. The United
*Ibid.. p. 254.
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State*, in 1830, had a population of nearly thirteen 
million*.3 In IBC^ only about one twentieth of the American 
people lived west of the Alleghenies; but when Jackson was 
inaugurated President, one third of the populace already 
lived in that region; so that the West by 1829 contained 
almost twice as many people as It had at the beginning of 
the century. This Western migration, of monumental conse­
quence, increased the number of states from thirteen to 
twenty one. By 1829 the entire domain east of the 
Mississippi River had been carved into states except for 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida; and beyond that river 
Louisiana and Missouri had won acceptance as members of the 
Union.
C. Turner's philosophy of sectionalism, as applied
particularly to the period of 1830-1850, is best summed up
in his own words:
Each section had its own interest and worked to 
make it effective in the entire United States.
Within each section there were varied regions. . . 
These regions limited sectional unanimity, 
especially in Presidential elections.
The American statesmen of the years between 
1830 and 1850, at least, were, on the whole, 
representative of the sections from which they 
came, authentic exponents of these sections' 
fundamental trait* and ideals; but they were 
more than this, for they had, also, to deal with 
the nation.
%egro population included. Ibid., p. 14.
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However, political leadership and political parties,
while acting as elastic bands to hold the sections together,
broke down in times of stress*
When measures of importance arose, party lines 
usually gave way to sectional divisions. Even 
at such times, party served as a moderating
influence, forcing the adjustment and compromise
the
leaders.'
between the sections in the policies of
1m a d a v #  4
Whether proclaiming a sectional or a national 
philosophy (says Turner), the leaders, in effect, were think­
ing in terms of their own section. Jackson expressed the 
attitude of the West; Calhoun voiced the interests of the 
Southeast; and Webster, the so-called Apostle of National­
ism, had his philosophy deeply shaped by New England 
sectional interests.
By 1828 the West had achieved such power that it was 
able to persuade the politicians to nominate a presidential 
candidate who could represent their ideas, as against the 
candidate (Adams) whose strength lay in the last. In order 
to understand the means by which Jackson won the presidency, 
Turner draws a distinction between the "Jackson men" and the 
"Jacksonian Democrats."* The former included not only the 
trans-Alleghany followers of Old Hickory and kindred people 
of Pennsylvania, but also the tidewater aristocracy of the 




upon the characteristic* of the back country. The Southern 
vote to support Jackson was sizable. The leaders of the 
South, John Taylor and his followers, responding to the 
general democratic call, threw their forces to Jackson in 
order to defeat the combined forces of Adams of New England, 
and Clay of the Kentucky and Ohio Valleys. They expected to 
use Jackson to destroy the nationalistic policy of Clay— as 
embodied in the "American System" of protective tariffs and 
internal improvements~-as well as to uphold slavery in the 
South, The Southern leaders were soon disillusioned. They 
had miscalculated the tempo of the time by failing to recog­
nize Western self-consciousness and its determination to 
carry its own ideas into the conduct of the government.
These ideas were, in reality, in conflict with those of the 
seaboard Southern states.
In the election of 1828 Jackson secured 178 electoral 
votes against 83 for Adams, and a popular vote of 647,000 
against Adams's 508,000. Taken together, the traditionally 
Democratic portions of New York, practically all of 
Pennsylvania, the South Atlantic and South Central states 
(except Kentucky), and the almost unbroken area of Indiana, 
Illinois, and Missouri, voted for Jackson; New England and 
groups of counties which had followed the leadership of Clay, 
in Kentucky, Ohio and Virginia voted for Adams.^
^Ibid.. pp. 28-30.
6
An eminent historian, Edward Channing, has emphasized 
that a "solid South" had elected a "Southern" slaveholder 
and cotton planter; aided by the Democracy of Pennsylvania 
and New York, it was primarily the South that had gained 
victory for Jackson.? With this interpretation Turner does 
not agree. He admits that "if one conceives of the 'West* 
of that time as limited to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, with 
their twenty four electoral votes, the 'West* could not have 
elected Jackson."® But, according to his research, the 
South Atlantic and the South Central states were at that 
time separate sections, and upcountry and tidewater South 
Atlantic were far from "solid." Moreover, Delaware gave its 
votes to Adams, and Maryland was divided. What Turner means 
by the "West" of the time were, thus, those states of 
Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana, Illinois and Ohio of the North­
west, and Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Alabama of 
the Southwest. They gave the election to Jackson. The 
result showed that an agricultural society, strongest in the 
regions of rural isolation rather than in the area of greater 
density of population and of greater wealth, had triumphed,
?ldward Channing, A History of United States. (New York, 
1921), Vol. 5, pp.
^Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States. 1830-1850.
(New York, 1935), p. 30. Hereafter" cited as Turner,
United States.
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for the first time, over the conservative, industrial, 
commercial, and manufacturing society of the New England 
type.*
II
While the frontier was generally accepted as vital
in its contribution to Jacksonian Democracy, the impact of
labor on the politics of that period has never been neglected
by historians of nineteenth century America.
John R. Commons, commenting on the labor problems of
the eighteen twenties, assertss
The decreasing bargaining power of mechanics, 
resulting from the revolution in the means of 
marketing the product, coupled with the horrors 
of the depression, was doubtless sufficient to 
account for a labor movement. Though the move­
ment derived its main motive from economic 
conditions, it was shaped principally by the 
political and social conditions of the time.
Even Frederick J. Turner himself would not deny the 
fact that "about the time of triumphant Jacksonian Democracy, 
around 1830, labor became increasingly self-conscious and 
strikes were more frequently in evidence," The labor organ­
izations "adopted their policy of giving their vote to
*Ibid.
lOjohn R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor In The 
United States. (New York, 1918), Vol. 1% 1̂ %. Here­
after referred to as Commons, Labor.
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whatever candidates would pledge themselves to support the 
working class."11
In her analysis of the presidential election of 1828, 
Florence Weston shared the same idea that both major parties 
attempted to win over the workingmen. The workingmen, she 
states, generally preferred Jackson*s party. The Administra­
tion party (Adams), particularly in the Northeast where the 
industrial classes predominated, viewed disparagingly the 
mechanics and apprentices, and were blind to the importance 
of gaining their favor or were too aristocratic to seek it. 
The Jacksonians, on the other hand, took up labor’s cause 
with pride and allied themselves strongly with the labor 
movement during the very years of its inception. The work, 
ingmen’s party put forward no candidates in national 
elections; instead, workers cast their votes for Jackson.1% 
In order to understand the conditions against which 
the labor movement was directed, it is necessary to consider 
the changed circumstances of the life of the common man in 
the new industrial centers of the East since the opening 
years of the nineteenth century.
Prior to the introduction of the factory system, 
manufacturing in America had been carried out under the so- 
called "domestic system." The master workman, bringing
l^Turner, United States, p. 123.
l^Florence Weston, The Presidential Election of 1828. 
(Washington, D. C.,1^38), pp. 79-81.
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together journeymen and apprentices for work on common 
projects or joint enterprises and paying them wages, had not 
created an employer-employee relationship in any modern 
sense. There was no real differentiation between the 
interests of the journeymen and those of the masters who
labored side by side with them.
But with the application of machinery at the turn of
the nineteenth century, the situation of the workingman
changed radically. Entrepreneurs, seeking to reduce costs 
in meeting the highly competitive conditions of new world 
business, began to hold down wages, lengthen working hours, 
and tap new sources of cheap labor. Under these circum­
stances, the skilled workers found themselves fighting a 
defensive war against the mounting resources of the employers 
The various labor organizations which originated during the 
early nineteenth century sought to safeguard the status of 
the skilled workers. Carpenters, painters, shoemakers, 
shipwrights and weavers were the first to organize. They 
were, in fact the real union pioneers, and succeeded in 
maintaining active societies throughout the first twenty 
years of the nineteenth century.
Early evidence of unrest appears in the extensive 
circulation, in the spring of 1827, of a pamphlet contain­
ing "a general view of the evils under which the working 
people are laboring and plan for their efficient removal."13
l̂ Conaaons, Labor, p. 186.
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Apparently stimulated by this statement, 600 journeymen
carpenters of Philadelphia went on strike in June, 1827, for
a ten-hour day working schedule. Soon bricklayers, painters,
glaziers and other groups became interested in the struggle
of the carpenters. They joined together to form a central
organization for national aid and protection in similar
disputes. In the latter half of 1827, therefore, there was
formed the Mechanics* Union of Trade Associations. All
workingmen were invited to join and "those trades who are as
yet destitute of trade societies" were urged to "organize
and send their delegates as soon as possible."1*
The immediate object of the Association was:
To avert, if possible, the desolating evils 
which must inevitably arise from a deprecia­
tion of the intrinsic value of human labor; 
to raise the mechanical and productive classes 
to that condition of true independence and 
equality; to promote, equally, the happiness, 
prosperity and welfare of the whole community 
... and to assist ... in establishing a just 
balance of power, both mental, moral, politi­
cal and scientific, between all the various 
classes and individuals which constitute 
society at large.**
Such were the ambitious purposes of the first city central
labor union.
In July, 1828, in urging its members to nominate 
candidates to represent the interest of the working classes
14jbld., p. 190, 
ISlbid.
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In the city council and the state legislature,the 
Association in Philadelphia broke fresh ground for labor and 
inaugurated what was to become a widespread political move­
ment of workingmen’s parties. It soon spread to other towns 
in Pennsylvania; to New York where wide popular support 
developed; to upstate New York, and to Massachusetts aM 
other parts of New England. Indeed, workingmen’s political 
parties spread as far as Ohio.
Politicians of both Republican and Democratic parties 
soon made valiant efforts to divert this labor movement into 
their respective parties. The meeting at the Northern 
Liberties, Philadelphia, was thrown into a state of confusion 
by a bitter speech charging both the chairman and the secre­
tary with working for the Administration. The discussion 
which ensued showed much difference of opinion among those 
assembled, and the meeting was pacified only when a request 
was made that all Jackson men remain behind after the others 
left. Those who were present endorsed Jackson as their 
candidate in the forthcoming election.1? Suspicion was not 
lacking that both the Adams and the Jackson men were 
intruders, who did not wish the laborites to organize a 
separate party.
l*Ibid.. p. 191. 
l^ibid.. pp. 195-196.
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These developments were the first expression of the 
awakening forces of the laboring classes in the twenties.
Ill
In his book, The Age of Jackson, published in 1945,
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. claims that;
Jacksonian Democracy, which has always appeared 
an obvious example of Western influence in 
American government, is not so pat a case as 
some have thought; that its development was 
shaped much more by reasoned and systematic 
notions about society than has been generally 
recognized; that many of its beliefs and 
motives came rather from the East and South 
than the West.*®
His is the strongest statement yet made that a substantial 
movement of Eastern laboring classes, led and inspired by 
the radical anti-capitalistic elements among Jackson’s 
supporters, became a significant part of the great Jackson­
ian Revolution*
In support of his theme Schlesinger first places 
strong emphasis on the transformation of social philosophy 
as a consequence of the industrial revolution in the eighteen 
twenties. Because of this revolution the working classes 
were becoming conscious of a common plight which required 
unity for defense. Then, he points out the specific problems 
produced by the "American System" as the background of this
^^Arthur N. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson. (Boston, 
1945), X. Hereafter cited as schlesinoer. Jackson.
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social unrest. Finally, he explores the activities of the
various leading Jacksonian men to corroborate his argument. 
Taken together, as the author reiterates time and again, 
the Jacksonian period was a struggle between the "producing" 
and "non-producing" classes— the farmers and laborers, on 
the one hand, and the business community on the other. The 
basic Jacksonian ideas came naturally enough from the East, 
which best understood the nature of business power, and 
reacted sharply against it.19
In the early days of the republic, Alexander Hamilton 
had already developed a political philosophy of the new 
industrialism. No society, Hamilton believed, could succeed 
"which did not unite the interest and credit of rich indi­
viduals with those of the s t a t e . T h e  Report on 
Manufacture was the first expression of an industrial vision 
for the American future. Jefferson who looked upon urban 
labor with mistrust and abhorrence failed to recognize the 
direction of this bustling nation. His very notion that the 
land be kept free from the corruption of industrialism was, 
however, betrayed by his own favorite measure, the Embargo 
Act of 1807, which helped encourage the growth of manufac­
tures along the Atlantic coast. This growth marked the 
advent of the factory system in American history; and while
l*ibid.. pp. 306-307.
^%equoted from Schlesinger, Jackson, p. 24.
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manufacturing was conducted only in scattered districts and 
upon a comparatively small scale as measured by modern 
standards, it profoundly influenced the lives of the working 
classes immediately concerned.
Henry Clay carried the Federalist program a step 
further by announcing a new scheme«*the "American System,"
It was mainly based upon the assumption of Hamilton's 
funding plan in order to keep the national debt from extinc­
tion; the debt made the bank indispensable as a financial 
agent, and the tariff Indispensable as a source of revenue. 
"While it certainly did not violate principles of political 
equality, yet its tendency was widely felt to be destructive 
of economic equality. It was thus more abhorred by the
dispossessed classes of the East ... than it was by the West,
21where classes hardly existed."
With the extension of suffrage during the twenties, 
coupled with the impact of new industrialism in the Northern 
and Middle states, the old ideas inexorably cruaùsled away. 
The workingmen, shut off from the rest of society, began to 
develop a sense of class-consciousness. They held conven­
tions, published addresses, founded newspapers and trade
^^Schlesinger, Jackson, pp. 57-58.
^&)f the industrial states of this period, Massachusetts 
granted the suffrage in 1820, and New York in 1832, while 
in Pennsylvania, the constitution of 1870 had already 
extended the right of suffrage to all those who paid any 
kind of state or county tax. See Commons, Labor, p. 176.
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unions• Their main effort was to vindicate their social 
status, to regain a feeling of self-respect and security.
Thus their demand centered around popular education; 
abolition of imprisonment for debt; the compulsory militia 
system which penalized the rich for non-attendance with a 
fine, and the poor with imprisonment; the banking system 
which offered the workingman none of the advantage of credit 
but. Instead, frequently caused him to be paid his wages in 
depreciated banknotes. After Jackson became President, the 
labor movement reached its climax. "Jacksonian speeches 
roused it, much Jacksonian legislation was based on it, the 
Jacksonian press appealed to it."23 The laboring men began 
slowly to turn to him as their leader, and his party as 
their party.
"The driving energy of Jacksonian democracy, like 
that of any aggressive reform movement, came from a small 
group of men, joined together ... to transform the existing 
o r d e r . This small group, later known as the "Kitchen 
Cabinet," consisted mostly of literary men and ex-journalists 
who had hitherto been denied the privileges to which they 
felt their abilities and energies entitled them. Amos 
Kendall, ex-journalist and hard-money devotee, who had long 
been imbued with socialistic thought, now became the
^^Schlesinger, Jackson, p. 379. 
p. 67.
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President's top brain truster. As described by one of the 
contemporary writers, Kendall was "supposed to be the 
moving spring of the administration, the thinker, the plan­
ner, and the doer,"25 in fact, he was one of the few 
schemers of the Bank war and the eventual veto.^^ On the 
labor issue his position was crystal clear. "Those who 
produced all wealth," he declared, "are themselves left 
poor. They see principalities extending and palaces built 
around them, without being aware that the entire expense is 
a tax upon themselves."27 in support of Jackson's second 
term, he made one of his rare public speeches to the Central 
Hickory Club in December, 1832, part of which directly 
addressed itself to the dilemma of New England labor. In 
that speech, Kendall concisely criticized the effects of 
manufacturing monopolies upon the states in which they were 
located.
To further analyze the new souls in the Jacksonian 
movement, Schlesinger traces the activities of the respec­
tive labor leaders in two Atlantic states, Massachusetts and 
New York. In both states the banking system was firmly 
entrenched, manufacturing had gained a strong hold, and finan­
cial, industrial and commercial groups were active in politics.
2^Ibid.. p. 72.
26lbid.. pp. 80, 98, 100.
27Requoted from Schlesinger, Jackson, p. 306.
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In Massachusttts an attempt to bring about a broader 
political organization of workers was made in 1832 with the 
formation of the New England Association of Farmers,
Mechanics and Workingmen. The success won by this group in 
local elections inspired the nomination of Samuel Clesson 
Allen (an ex-National Republican) for governor. The New 
England Association urged the working classes to rally in 
support of the Democrats* Here, it can be seen that it was 
the Democrats who most directly supported labor aims. When 
Jackson launched his war against the United States Bank, 
vigorously attacking monopoly and special privileges on a 
score of fronts, artisans, mechanics and laborers naturally 
rallied behind him.
The twists and turns of politics in the 1830’s are 
one thing, however, and another is the steady growth of 
progressive principles and the practical achievement of the 
reforms the workers sought. Among their leaders Seth Luther 
was the most colorful. "With a cud of tobacco generally in 
his mouth, and cherishing a bitter passion for the working 
c l a s s e s ,"28 he had long engaged in the labor movement and 
shared the general range of workingmen’s notions. His chief 
interest was the promotion of manual labor eduction. Social 
inequality, he argued, was "produced and sustained by AVARICE
28Requoted from ibid.. p. 149,
IB
and was to be cored by education, especially by the 
establishment of manual-labor schools."^9
For Theodore Sedgwick, a newly converted radical and 
free trader by profession, the essence of reform was the 
destruction of monopolies. Between 1836 and 1839 he 
published three bulky volumes on Public and Private Economy, 
in which flow his hatred of the monied class and synqpathy 
for the common man.
Throughout these turbulent years of social unrest, 
Massachusetts was as yet a conservative state, predominantly 
controlled by the Whig Republicans. But the great social 
uproar had gradually caused many old Federalists to side 
with the Democrats for reforms. The apostasies of Allen and 
Sedgwick were of such nature.
In 1834 another young and aggressive leader, George 
Bancroft, took steps to repudiate his past link with the 
conservatives and cast his lot with the workingmen. One of 
the nineteenth century's greatest historians, he deplored 
the fate of political liberty when it was not founded on 
economic liberty. "The feud between the capitalist and the 
laborer, the house of Have and the house of Want, is as old 
as social union, and can never be entirely quieted."^
^%equoted from ibid.. p. 150. 
SpRequoted from ibid., p. 163.
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For # moment, Boncroft hod becom# the eontcienco of tho 
Domoorotio Forty in Mostochyootto, oryotollimlmg tho Imq̂ yl*## 
of reform so long ignored.
The rite of the redicol wing, reinforced by tuch 
otrong end popular ehereotero e# Bancroft, Sedgwick tml 
Allen, gave the Democratic Party # new tybetantlel force.
A Whig paper in 1834 noted that "Working-meniem a W  Jack ton» 
ianiam would turn out to be identical. Every day*# 
development goat to confirm thie belief ... the large 
majority of the prominent Working mem are aiwwed Jaekton 
Men."^^ If thie warn not always true, it was sufficiently 
close to the mark to suggest that the victories m>n by the 
advance of Jacksonian democracy were in suiny instances 
victories that owed a great deal to the worker’s support.
In New York labor grievances were similar to those in 
Massachusetts, though the former was the traditional home of 
the Albany Regency that always favored labor reforms. But 
the New York movement snis much more an urban affair because 
of the cosfarative prosperity of the faremrs.
Four outstanding leaders stood out for their influence 
on the New York labor party. In the earliest stage, the 
party was largely under the control of Thomas Skidmore, a 
machinist by trade, who had been instrumental in persuading 
the workers to broaden their program as a means of coercing
S&Requoted from ibid.. p. 157.
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their aristocratic oppressors into obtaining the ten-hour 
day. Wholly self-educated, he was a violent, fanatical 
devotee of the worker’s cause and had developed an agrarian 
philosophy that questioned the entire basis of existing 
property rights. His views were shortly set forth in a 
formidable treatise which he comprehensively entitled 
The Right of Men to Property. Skidmore specifically proposed 
that all debts and property claims should be at once 
cancelled. After such a communistic division of property, 
the maintenance of equality would be assured by doing away 
with all inheritance.
A second leader» who accepted at least in part the 
Skidmore program but was to be far more influential in the 
workingmen's movement in these and later years, was George 
Henry Evans, A printer by trade, he founded the Working 
Man's Advocate, perhaps the most important labor journal of 
the day. The organ for the New York party, it turned out a 
continuous stream of articles and editorials promoting the 
worker's interests. In 1822, Colonel Richard Johnson 
proposed a bill in the Senate calling for the abolition of 
imprisonment for debt. But for some years, it failed of 
passage. Now, Evans, with the weapon of the Advocate and 
backed by the Owenites, continued to push the Johnson 
program through. Finally, in 1832, the bill passed both the 
Houses and became law. Evans was also noted for his anti­
clerical attitudes. Not only did he constantly attack the
21
church, but he believed that the Anti-Masonic party was the 
Christian party in disguise, "the most dangerous secret 
society that ever existed in the country.Later through 
the Advocate he contributed much to the program of federal 
grant of lands to the Eastern workingmen. Indeed, the 
passage of the Homestead Act of 1862, though passed after 
his death, is Evans * proudest claim.
As if such leadership were not enough to condemn the 
workingmen's party in the eyes of all conservatives, it was 
further "damned" by the participation in its activities of 
another brace of radical reformers; Robert Dale Owen and 
Frances Wright. Having recently moved to New York from the 
cooperative community at New Harmony, Indiana, where Robert 
Owen had attempted to put into practice his socialistic 
program for replacing the factory system,these two 
naturally seized upon the workingmen's movement as a medium 
for promoting their own particular brand of reform. They 
had founded a paper, the Free Enquirer, to publish their 
ideas and it was soon campaigning vigorously in support of 
the new labor party.
Robert D. Owen believed strongly in a more equitable 
distribution of wealth, was opposed to organized religion.
32&#quoted from ibid.. p. 138.
33lbid.. p. 182.
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and advocated iwre liberal divorce laws, but his primary 
interest was in free, public education.
Frances Wright was at once the most zealous, the most 
colorful and, in the eyes of contemporaries, the most 
dangerous of these reformers associated with the New York 
workingmen's party. Of Scottish origin, tall, slender, with 
wavy chestnut hair, she completely dazzled workingmen's 
audiences. Wherever she went, she fomented the seed of 
social revolution. She pointed out four basic evils which 
contributed to the present crisis* technological improve­
ments, the banking system and paper money, the professional 
aristocracy and, most fundamental, a false system of educa­
tion. The only salvation, according to her scheme, was the 
state guardianship of free education for all children, thus 
to eliminate class prejudices at the beginning.
Later, during the Bank War, the workingmen again found 
two other dauntless leaders, William C. Bryant and William 
Leggett; both fought against the grant of special privi­
leges. They felt all business, including banking, should be 
thrown open to universal competition.
Toward the end of 1833 the rapid growth and develop­
ment of individual trade societies led naturally to the 
movement for closer cooperation in promoting their common 
aims. A successful carpenters' strike in the spring of 1833
34Ibid.. p. 183.
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led to the formation of a General Trade Union. In 1834, 
encouraged by the flurry of labor organization throughout 
the East, the General Trade Union issued a manifesto calling 
for a national organization. Through five hot August days, 
thirty earnest men were gathered in New York to form the 
National Trade Union,^ Hence, the labor movement in 
polities gradually declined. The rise and fall of Loco 
Focos and the depression of 1837 marked the end of labor*# 
venture into the political arena. This occurred just about 
the time when Jackson’s second administration ended.
35Ibid.. pp. 192-193.
CHAPTER II
ATTACKS ON ARTHUR SCHLESIN6ER, JR.'S 
THE AGE OF JACKSON
Since The Ace of Jackson by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
was published in 1945, criticisms of it have multiplied. 
While some agree with this thesis but point out that he has 
slurred over certain crucial facts, others bluntly reject 
the authenticity of his daring historical hypothesis.
I
In an essay entitled "Public Policy and National 
Bank,"l Bray Hammond generally agrees with Schlesinger*s 
view that Jacksonian Democracy reflected Eastern as well as 
frontier influences, but notes that he has erred in associ­
ating the Eastern influence with labor alone and not with 
business enterprise. To be sure, both had grievances. The 
panic of 1837 had a calamitous effect on the business 
community no less than it did on labor. For a period, the 
middle class entrepreneurs— who wanted business democratized, 
and thus espoused laissez faire— Joined Jackson to fight for 
decentralizing the existing Hamiltonian social order. The 
downfall of the Second Bank of the United States meant that
^Bray Hammond, "Public Policy and National Bank," Journal 
of Economic History. Vol. 6 (May, 1946), pp. 79-B4.'"
Hereafter cited as Hammond, "Bank."
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fret enterprise won over monopoly. The world of business, 
in the age of Jackson, had become the stronghold of America's 
new rugged individualism. Thus Hammond's critique proposes 
a serious modification of the interpretation by Schlesinger,
II
A greater part of Schlesinger*s book deals with the 
individual personalities of certain social reformers in the 
Jacksonian era. Their activities and influences,
Schlesinger assumes, were decisive in formulating the 
character of this labor movement. But, is this assumption 
true? In other words, were these reformers really radical, 
and their theories anti-capitalistic? Were the workingmen's 
movements and parties of the period truly movements of the 
wage-earners? Joseph Dorfman, professor of economics at 
Columbia University, answers these questions in the negative. 
According to his findings, even the terminologies which 
Schlesinger applies are misused.^
Theodore Sedgwick, cited by Schlesinger as the 
champion of the labor class, was actually a covetous merchant 
who adamantly opposed any anti-capitalistic schemes. In his 
much lauded volume. Public and Private Economy, he urged 
maintenance of the status quo of the current social hierachy.
^ee Joseph Dorfman, "The Jackson Wage-Earner Thesis," 
American Historical Review, Vol. 54 (January, 1949), pp. 
296-306.Hereafter cited as Dorfman, "Thesis."
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The emancipation of the proletariat, according to his ideas, 
could only be achieved through strict abstinence and 
frugality,
Theophilus Fisk, newspaper editor and considered by 
Schlesinger as a leader of anti-capitalistic forces, held 
that debt Itself was the great curse. He felt that impru­
dent debtors were unfit to exercise the right of suffrage. 
Fisk’s psychology, according to Dorfman, was much more that 
of a businessman than a radical leader. As a businessman, 
he could hardly be anti-capitalistic. In the case of 
William Leggett, the New York journalist whom Schlesinger 
cites, his attitude toward the laboring classes was even 
more obvious. Leggett was fundamentally opposed to a 
general labor union. He thought it would threaten the 
regular economic life of society and thus create anarchy and 
social disorder.
In Philadelphia, in 1829, a group of workingmen 
according to Schlesinger, called a meeting and petitioned 
the state legislature not to charter additional banks. The 
petition states that the banks had created a chaotic situa­
tion in which the livelihood of the laboring classes was 
badly threatened because of the excessive issuance of paper 
money. Condy Raguet and William Gouge, two eminent 
Jacksonian economists, are believed to be the authors of the 
petition. Raguet was originally a merchant and editor of 
the Free Trade Advocate, but became a state senator in 1820.
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Dorfman points out that Raguet had seldom expressed his 
opinion in favor of the workingmen. In the Free Trade 
Advocate he once declared that to reduce working hours or to 
raise wages would contradict "the great principle of nature 
called the law of competition."3 Gouge took the same 
attitude toward labor. His theory of the ills of society 
was similar to social Darwinism of a later period; that 
under the principle of competition only the fittest can 
survive. The laborers who could not make their own salva­
tion had to depend upon others for means of both subsistence 
and employment.
Of the other so-called Jacksonian labor leaders, 
Dorfman holds that they were not anti-capitalistic in 
substance nor radical in nature. Frances Wright was but a 
strict Malthusian; James Ronaldson, long time leader of a 
"labor union," was a stockholder and extremely wealthy 
employer; Thomas Skidmore, a leader of the New York working­
men's party, was an advocate of the protective tariff, which 
was hardly Jacksonian.
Schlesinger points out, as an indication of anti- 
capitalism, that the workingmen's parties espoused the 
abolition of imprisonment for debt. But imprisonment for 
debt was, nevertheless, as Dorfman states, not an exclusive 
condemnation of the poor only; It was also inflicted upon
3lbid.. p. 299.
28
unfortunate businessmen In time of stress. Satirically 
enough, Daniel Webster, the so-called arch foe of the 
Jacksonian laborites, was the president of the Boston chap* 
ter of the debtor’s relief organization.
Dorfman concludes that Jacksonian radicalism was 
indeed a movement of monetary reform. But, "the purpose of 
the monetary reform was not to help labor, but to create 
better business conditions and remove panics.** As to the 
name "workingmen," says Dorfman, it was used at that time 
to include "not merely manual labor, but every man who
earned his bread by useful exertion, whether mental or
physical."5 The so-called radical movement was by no wans 
anti-capitalistic but, to a certain extent, anti-aristo- 
cratic. The whole movement was based upon two elements, 
humanitarian and business, with the latter of course playing 
the vital role. Of all the factions that constituted the 
Jacksonian "workingmen," it would seem that the wage earners 
were the least favored. For, as best explained by one of 
the top Jacksonian economists, Churchill C. Cambreleng,
"labor solicits no particular privileges— it asks only for a 
sound currency."6 Furthermore, and of most importance, there 





constitute a great menace to the rapidly emerging laisser 
faire econo^.
In short, the most that can be said for the Jackson» 
Ian movement's being anti-capitalistic, is presumably that 
it opposed the concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
few, and the manipulation of political power by special 
privileges,
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Thus far the argument has been that most of the 
active leaders of the workingmen's parties in the Jacksonian 
movement were neither radical nor pro-labor. This still 
leaves unanswered the question of whether the Eastern 
laborer aligned himself with the Jacksonian*, as Schlesinger 
has alleged. According to Schlesinger, it was this support 
which was instrumental in explaining the success of the 
Democratic party from 1828 to 1840.
William A, Sullivan has presented the story of labor 
and politics in the city of Philadelphia,? and Edward Pessen 
in the city of Boston;® both want to ascertain to what extent 
labor supported Andrew Jackson and/or the Democratic party.
?William A. Sullivan, "Did Labor Support Andrew Jackson?" 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 62 (March, 1947), 
pp. 5o9-500, ftsreafter cited as Sullivan, "Did Labor 
Support Jackson?"
®Edward Pessen, "Did Labor Support Jackson?; The Boston
Story," PoUttcfi Sejeqce parierly, Vol. 64 (June, 1949),
pp. 262-274.Hereafter cited as Pessen, "Jackson; Boston.
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To begin his analysis, Sullivan points out certain 
facts regarding the complicated political situation then 
existing in that city. The old Federalist party, which had 
disappeared in national politics and practically so in state 
politics, was still active in strictly local affairs. The 
Democratic party had split into two factions, one known as 
the Administrative or Adams party and the other as the 
Jackson party. After Jackson’s victory in 1828, the anti- 
Jackson sentiment was absorbed into an anti-Sutherland move­
ment.^ This branch of the Democratic party was comparatively 
weak and frequently fused with the Federal, or as it was 
later called, the Whig party. Local contests were generally 
between a fusion ticket put up by the Federalist and anti- 
Jackson or anti-Sutherland men, and the Jackson or Sutherland 
wing of the Democratic party. When the workingmen’s party 
was organized, in July, 1828, the Federalist party was in 
control of the city, and the Jackson party had secured 
control of the county.
From the beginning the new movement was obliged to 
fight for its existence against the machinations of 
professional politicians who tried either to obtain control 
of the meetings or to break them up. The efforts of the 
Democratic party, which claimed a sort of proprietary
9joel 6. Sutherland was a local political leader in 
Philadelphia# a strong supporter of Andrew Jackson.
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interest in the workingmen, were directed primarily toward
splitting the new party into factions. The Federalists, on
the other hand, were trying hard to use the workingmen’s
movement for their own advancement.
Early in April, 1828, the Mechanics* Free Press, the
main organ through which labor expressed its view, had
warned that;
At present our danger is from our old master, 
the Democrats, for as most of us are deserters 
from their ranks, they view us with the same 
sensation as the mighty lord would the revolt 
of his vessels; there cannot be so much danger 
from the Federalists as, generally speaking, 
we were never inclined to trust them,10
The national triumph of Jackson in 1828 was also 
reflected in the local elections of Philadelphia; every
candidate of the Democratic party was swept into office.
But this success, according to Sullivan, can hardly be 
ascribed to the influence and the efforts of the working­
men’s party. Although the Jacksonians nominated three 
workingmen’s candidates for the City Assembly and twelve for 
the Common Council, the workingmen’s strength was relatively 
weak in that year. Of a total one thousand vote majority 
which the Democrats won over their opponents in the city, 
the workingmen’s party strength amounted to only 314,H




The year of 1829, however, was a turning point for 
the workingmen*s party. "The balance of power,* as the 
Mechanics* Free Press declared "has at length got into the 
hands of the working people, where it properly belongs, and 
it will be used, in future, for the general weal,"12 In 
January, 1829, the Workingmen*s Republican Political Associ­
ation was organized. This Association appears to have 
united with the anti-Sutherland faction and perhaps also 
with the Federalist party in putting up "the People * s 
Ticket* in opposition to the Sutherland forces. According 
to the Press’s report, this ticket won by an overwhelming 
majority.
Prior to the city’s general election in the fall of 
that year, the workingmen, in order to prove their non- 
partisanship, made their nomination before either of the 
other parties had acted. Out of thirty-two candidates on 
the city tickets nine were also named by the Federal party 
and only three by the Democratic party. In the county, out 
of nine workingmen’s candidates for the senate and assembly, 
three were endorsed by the combined anti-Sutherland and 
Federal parties, and none by the Democratic party.13 The 
election returns showed that the workingmen’s party was able 
to muster an average of 860 votes to sweep every Democrat
l^Ibid.. p. 572.
l^This information is from Commons, Labor, p. 200. It is 
included here to better explain Sullivan’s essay.
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into the City Assembly, though Jackson’s men retained a
small majority in the Select C o u n c i l . 14
Soon after the nomination of 1829, dissension began 
to take place in the ranks of the workingmen. A group of 
so-called "Democratic Workingmen" seceded from the movement 
and endorsed the regular Democratic candidates. Afterward 
there appears to have been closer affiliation of the 
workingmen's party with the amalgamated Federal and anti- 
Sutherland factions.15
In the following year, the workingmen’s party 
attempted to further consolidate its influence in 
Philadelphia. However, it was by and large destroyed by the 
worker’s inability to play the political game on the one hand, 
and the intrigues of party politicians on the other. In the 
state election, out of thirty-three candidates put up by the 
city convention, seven were on the Democratic ticket, twelve 
on the Federal ticket, and one on both* In the Congressional 
election the party nominated Stephen Simpson, the candidate 
of the Federal party, against Sutherland for senator.1&
The result of the election of 1830 saw a general triumph of 
the Democrats, who "carried the Senator and eight members of
l^Sullivan, "Did Labor Support Jackson?" p. 572. 
^^Commons, Labor. p. 204. 
p. 211.
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the Assembly, over the united forces of Federalism and 
Wdrkeylam."!?
In the fall election of 1831 the workingmen definitely 
lost their balance of power* This was the last year in which 
the workingmen*s party ever nominated a ticket, and nothing 
further is known of the political movement which originated 
in the carpenters* strike of 1827.
Sullivan has singled out three factors which led to 
the downfall of the workingmen*# party in Philadelphia, 
which also serves to support the argument given by Dorfman 
that the interests of the workingmen did not at all bear 
any Jacksonian label.
1. During the four years of its existence the 
workingmen*# party nominated and supported approximately 
one hundred candidates for the city elective offices. An 
analysis of these candidates, however, reveals their occupa­
tions as# ten workingmen, twenty-three professional men, 
fifty-three merchants and business men, eleven gentlemen, 
and three for whom no occupation was r e c o r d e d , This 
heterogeneous body of representatives could hardly solve any 
working-class problems in the interests of the workers.
2. The first city wide labor association was a loose 
organization in which there was probably no sense of class
l^Sullivan, "Did Labor Support Jackson?", p. 574, 
l^Ibld.. p. 575.
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consciousness as well as esprit de corps among the workers
themselves. As a result, it was easy for them to become the
prey of politicians who took advantage of the movement for
their own benefit. Moreover, they were too dependent upon
their fellow laborers as friends. The situation is best
Illustrated by the Mechanics* Free Press;
... The mechanics will find in time that many 
of their own class are their worst enemies.
Some young mechanics are actuated by this Idea 
of setting up their businesses and living on 
the profits arising out of the labor of others, 
and this will make them try to defeat every 
measure calculated to better the hard conditions 
of that class generally.*?
3. The role of the employers accounted for the
decrease of labor strength. Philadelphia was the home of 
the Second Bank with which all the businessmen had to 
associate. The workers, in order to gain their daily bread, 
had to listen to whatever their employer said and vote whom­
ever their employer dictated. This particular situation had 
been pointed out by the Pennsylvanian, a Jacksonian papers
... among the cruel acts resorted to by the 
Bank of the United States, to carry on a 
ruthless and traitorous warfare against the 
mechanics and workingmen, was that of sending 
agents around to all the large manufacturers 
to urge them to discharge their hands, draw In 
their business, and thus force the workingmen 
of the country to coto around and support the 




No matter what may have caused the failure of the 
workingmen’s party, one thing is certain according to 
SullivanÎ The Democrats were incapable of holding the votes 
of labor.
IV
To supplement Sullivan’s attack on Schlesinger*s 
thesis, Edward Pessen draws another picture of the city of 
Boston. Boston was a key urban center in the East where 
over 10,000 workers were engaged in manufacturing enterprises 
during the Jacksonian period.
Assuming that Boston’s workingmen’s party had never 
constituted an important faction and, avoiding the enigma 
of whether it was or was not composed of laborers, Pessen 
deals mainly with ward voting records rather than with the 
positions and platforms of the alleged workingmen’s party.
In order to demonstrate how workers voted, Pessen 
employs a method of dividing the assessed valuation of 
property in each ward by the population of each ward. He 
assumes the lowest per capita figures as the working-class 
wards. Based upon this tabulation, he has readily arrived 
at the conclusion that Boston’s laborers were overwhelmingly 
pro-Whig.
A brief summary of his findings for the entire period 
from 1828 to 1836 followst
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Iiï the 1828 presidential election workingmen split 
their votes, 21 per cent for Jackson and 79 per cent for 
the Whig candidates* In only one working-class ward did 
the former receive slightly more than one-third of the 
total votes.
The state election of 1829 saw much political 
machinations among the Jacksonians* Even by nominating 
such a strong and influential character as David Henshaw, 
who controlled the strategic area of the Port of Boston, 
the Democratic party was unable to beat the Whigs for the 
governorship*
In July, 1830, the workingmen * s party emerged in 
Boston. Its first attempt in December of that year to 
elect candidates for the offices of mayor and aldermen 
resulted in utter defeat* The following spring a full 
workingmen’s party ticket for city offices received only 
100 votes out of a total of 3,066 cast.^l Incidentally, 
analysis of workingmen’s party candidates reveals that a 
great majority were of the wealthier classes* This is 
sufficient evidence, to Pessen, that the workingmen’s 
party did not represent the interests of the workingmen*
^^Pessen, "Jackson* Boston," p* 266.
38
In two gubernatorial elections in 1831^^ the Democrat# 
were again deserted by labor. Apparently harassed by this 
situation, David Henshaw, now the sole Democratic leader in 
Boston, charged that Boston's workingmen were the enemies of 
Democracy.
The Bank veto was the major issue of the presidential 
election of 1832. Analysis of the Boston vote indicates an 
increase in favor of the Democratic party. This Is to be 
explained, in part, by workingmen's opposition to the Second 
Bank. Nevertheless, despite this issue, 73 per cent of the 
total vote was in favor of the Whigs. The gubernatorial 
election of 1834 indicated gains of the Democratic ticket 
in the poorer wards. However, it was still the Whigs who 
swept the votes. Indeed, it was not until the presidential 
election of 1836 that the Democrats captured three out of 
five working-class wards.
Several conclusions are derived by Pessen, First, 
Jackson, throughout his two terms as president, was never 
supported at the polls by the workingmen. Secondly, Boston 
was predominantly a Whig city in which the Whig-influenced 
merchants played an important part in dictating the votes 
of their employees. Thirdly, the Democratic party in Boston 
had, from the beginning, been controlled by non-Jacksonian
^^A state law passed after the April election had taken 
place, designating November as the new date for the state 
election. See ibid.
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conservative* of Henshaw** custom ring. Finally, it was not
the urban workers but the rural farmers who gave their 
support to Jackson’s candidates.
V
Some critics have concluded that most of the Jackson­
ian leaders were neither radical nor pro-labor and their 
alleged parties really middle class (Dorfman); or that the 
workingmen did not vote for Jackson (Sullivan and Pessen). 
None has analyzed Andrew Jackson himself. Was Jackson a real 
saviour of the toiling classes? This is the topic that 
Richard B. Morris has brought to light recently. His essay 
is significantly called "Andrew Jackson, Strikebreaker."23 
In it he compare* Jackson to a labor prosecutor; and the 
period as "an age of triumphant exploitation" rather than 
one of "triumphant liberalism."2* His essay deals with the 
labor dispute on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal in Maryland 
in 1834,
On January 18, 1334, a conflict developed between 
some local laborers and mechanics, and the Irish workers 
engaged on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. The Hagerstown 
Torchlight attributed the cause of the difficulty to "either
^%ichard B. Morris, "Andrew Jackson, the Strikebreaker," 
American Historical Review. Vol. 55 (October, 1949), 
pp. M-éÔ. Hereafter cited as Morris, "Strikebreaker,"
^̂ Ibid.. p. 68.
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the suspension of work, or of payment, on one or more 
sections of the canal." Nile# Weekly Reoister laid the 
cause of the outrage to "dissatisfaction about their pay." 
Thomas F. Purcell, resident engineer for the canal coogpany, 
ascribed this dispute to a struggle over the closed shop.^ 
Bloodshed followed as the conflict gradually developed to 
such an extent that each party had assembled several hundred 
men armed with weapons. The riot was not stopped until four 
days later when the county militia was dispatched to the 
scene. Purcell then reported, after a temporary cessation 
of hostilities, that "so deeply rooted is the hatred of the 
one party to the other, that X cannot flatter myself that it 
will be of long continuance."26
Alert over this situation, the local authorities 
submitted a request on January 28 to Annapolis for help. In 
response, the Maryland legislature passed two separate 
resolutions: one, in the name of the Governor, James Thomas,
calling upon the President for military aid; and the other 
authorizing the Governor to use state militia for immdiate 
suppression of any further riot. The President’s approval 
of the request for federal troops came unusually fast; they 
were dispatched to Maryland the next day, January 29. The 
promptness in action on the part of Jackson on this occasion 
has been surmised as a step toward aiding his old friend.
^Ibld.. p. 55.
2&Requoted from ibid.. p. 59.
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John H, Eaton, former Secretary of War and one of the 
original members of the "Kitchen Cabinet," who had now 
become the new president of the canal coiqpany.
Eaton wrote to the directors of the company on 
January 31t
The turning off from the woTks any large nuWser 
of hands, must necessarily bring about riotous 
feelings; and even riotous action. While the 
United States troops are in the neighbourhood, 
a dismissal may be made without these 
apprehensions.
In view of this correspondence, the presidential action may 
have more significance as a matter of personal concern than 
for the purpose of maintaining the local peace.
Norris points out, also, that the company was then in 
poor financial plight. To lay off the contracted laborers 
under normal conditions would cause the company additional 
expenses. As Eaton asserted, "we have at all times a right 
to control bad conduct and bad actions on our works."28 in 
other words, he would use the riot as a pretext for 
straightening up his company's budget on the one hand; and 
use the presence of federal troops as a coercive power to 
suppress labor on the other.
When, in February, 1835, laborers on another section 
of the canal went on strike for higher wages, the troops.
2?Requoted from ibid.. p. 62. 
2%equoted from ibid.. p. 65.
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still stationed at a nearby area, forced the strikers back 
to work.
Several conclusions may be derived, according to 
Morris. First, Andrew Jackson was the first President to 
send federal troops to stop a labor strike which was 
strictly local and had neither violated the federal law nor 
endangered national security. Secondly, because of this 
unprecedented action, Jackson cannot be called the champion 
of labor. Finally, though granting his hard money policy 
which would appeal to the laboring classes, the fact that he 
acted as a strikebreaker indicates he was really a protector
of the capitalist class,^9
^^The working classes were opposed to the common practise of banks issuing huge amounts of paper money which quickly depreciated in value. Many times they received their wages in this type of currency• Hence, they were for a hard money policy.
CHAPTER III 
COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OF THE CONTROVERSY
American historians are fond of comparing two eras of 
the past. They are the period of Andrew Jackson and the 
period of Franklin Roosevelt, both reflecting symbols of an 
age, of flux and democratic impulse. The voice of the 
people is usually discordant, but here m»re two of the very 
few men in America who have been unmistakably acclaimed by 
the voice of the people. There can be arguments about 
whether the people were right or m^ong, but there can be no 
argument about the men whom they wanted as President.
On the day of Jackson's inaugural, March 4, 1829, the 
White House was invaded by a multitude of "all ages, colors, 
and conditions," vAo "stood on chairs in their muddy boots, 
fought for the refreshments, and trod glass and porcelain 
underfoot."! But, who were those people who stormed the 
Presidential Palace? Historians have never ceased to inter­
pret the characteristics of this period. Among the various 
studies,2 the one given in The Aoe of Jackson by Arthur M. 
Schlesinger has won the most admiration and, indeed, stirred
up the most controversy. His thesis places a great deal of 
emphasis on the anti-capitalistic laboring forces in the




East as the mainspring of Jackson’s triumph from 1828 to 
1836. Contradictory essays soon appeared after its publica­
tion in 1945 which have apparently refuted this contention.
I
Joseph Dorfman’s "The Jackson Wage-Earner Thesis" 
has been, thus far, the most important critique of the 
Schlesinger thesis. His main criticism of The Aoe of 
Jackson is that the Jacksonian period is to be explained at 
a period of "class conflict between great capitalists on the 
one side and a mass of propertyless wage^earnere on the 
other."3 Upon this basis, Schlesinger has drawn a compar­
ison of the Jacksonian period to Roosevelt’s New Deal; both 
opposed economic royalism, Dorfman*s critique, outlined in 
Chapter 11 of this paper, denies the class conflict and 
social cleavage which he feels Schlesinger emphasizes.
Arthur Schlesinger has rebutted this criticism. 
According to him. The Aoe of Jackson, while admitting the 
existence of class consciousness, does not argue that there 
was a class conflict in the Jacksonian period. It does, 
however, argue that there was a struggle of non-business 
groups against business domination of the government.4
%orfman, "Thesis," p. 305.
4See Schlesinger’8 letter to the American Historical Review. 
Vol. 54 (April, 1949), p. 786. Hereafter ciîedi as 
Schlesinger, "Letter."
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The Jacksonians were convinced of the relation between 
economic diversity and political freedom. So strong was 
this conviction that their aim, akin to the New Deal, "was 
to preserve capitalism and keep government out of the hands 
of the capitalists.George Bancroft, for example, 
declared: "We must protect these merchants, but not
governed by them."* To the Jacksonians, the dawning of 
capitalism in the wake of industrialisation was an 
ineradicable and even useful part of the economic landscape. 
The specific problem, however, was "to control the power of 
the capitalist groups, mainly Eastern, for the benefit of 
non*capitalist groups, farmers and laboring mn. East, West 
and South."? In short, Dorfman has misread the thesis of 
the book.
The nature of the Jacksonian Revolution sharply 
distinguishes the Jacksonians from socialists-»Utopians or 
Marxists*-who aim at destroying the capitalist system.
Dorfman also argues that "Jackson, no more than 
Jefferson, thought of himself as the champion of the wage- 
earner."® His use of this comparison seems to imply that 
Jackson, like Jefferson, also viewed urban laborers as
^Schlesinger, Jackson, pp. 338-339,
^IbiA', p. 339.
"̂ Ibid.. p. 307.
®Dorfraan, "Thesis," p. 306.
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‘’sorts* to the state and the "doom" of democracy. According 
to Oorfman, the Jacksonian movement was not at all liberal, 
if compared to the present-day liberalism which associates 
with a large wige-earner class and resorts to a broadening 
rather than a narrowing of the economic functions of govern­
ment. These interpretations, made to invalidate 
Schlesinger’s emphasis of the radical nature of Jacksonian- 
ism, deserve attention.
The question of whether or not Jackson exclusively 
sided with labor will be discussed later in this chapter.
But, one thing must be pointed out. Although Jackson 
inherited much of Jeffersonianism, he himself was not a 
strict Jeffersonian follower; at least he avoided Jefferson’s 
dislike of the industrial worker. The point is made in The 
Age of Jackson that "the Jeffersonian inheritance was 
strengthened by the infusion of fresh influences: notably
the anti-monopolistic ... and the pro-labor tradltion(s)."9 
In 1833 Jackson Inspected the mills of Lowell and 
meticulously inquired about hours, wages and production. 
Observers reported that "the subject of domestic manufactures 
had previously engaged his attentive observation."^® His 
allusions to the "producing classes" always included the 
working men of the cities.
%chlesinger, Jackson, p. 308.
l®Ibid., p. 311.
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The Jeffersonian age consisted largely of an 
agricultural society wherein the farm remained the basic 
center of American life. Its tradition was essentially an 
effort to restrict the power of the state on the one hand, 
and— in the face of physical expansion— to assert and main­
tain the old American ideals of individualism on the other* 
"Those who labor in the earth," Jefferson had said, "are the 
chosen people of God, if He had a chosen p e o p l e t h e  
American dream required that the land be kept free from the 
corruption of industrialism. The Jacksonian age certainly 
reflected a good deal more than the rational libertarianism 
of the old Jeffersonian Republicans. Boldly, Jacksonians 
accepted the rising tide of industrialism, the impact of 
which was never seriously felt in previous administrations. 
In the process of readjustment, the Jacksonians modified and 
expanded most of the Jeffersonian tenets and traditional 
social heritages. They demanded economic equality, in 
addition to political equality, and human rights to counter­
weigh property rights. Labor they regarded as the source of 
all wealth. But government, by granting special privileges—  
by bank charters, tariffs, and internal improvements--had 
raised up a privileged class and enabled this class to 
exploit the wealth of the laboring part of the community.
llRequoted from ibid.. p. 311.
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Jackson, in spite of the Jeffersonian inhibitions, 
was forced to adopt a strong government policy to check the 
rampant concentration of wealth and to restore the conditions 
of competition. The age of Jackson was one of reform, one 
that undertook to better the conditions of the individual 
not only in a political sense but also In an economic sense. 
By destroying monopolies, Jackson hoped to preserve liberty 
and democracy in a period of transition*
Dorfman has commented that many supporters of the 
"working classes" were not themselves either "workingmen" or 
"radical," and that relatively few bona fide "workingmen" 
were found in the anti-business forces. From these facts 
Dorfman has concluded that Jackson's "labor movement" was 
not "anti-capitalistic" but "anti-aristocratic•" To this 
comment, Schlesinger replies that he had used the term 
"anti-capitalistic" only in the sense of opposing capitalists 
in their attempts to control the government. Further, he 
agrees that the word "workingmen" cannot be explained as 
having included laborers alone.
Thus, part of the disagreement here is largely one of 
semantics. Schlesinger assumes that the "radical" force 
which constituted the Jacksonian Revolution was none other 
than the class of Eastern workingmen, which he has vaguely 
identified as "labor." However, Dorfman and other
l^Schlesinger, "Letter," pp. 785-786.
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coamentators attribute the same idea to the efforts of 
another group of people, which they have vaguely identified 
as "business." Neither Dorfman nor Schlesinger attempt to 
define the meaning of terms such as "labor," "workingmen," 
"radical" and so forth, for the period under discussion# 
Schlesinger states in The Aoe of Jackson, for 
examples
National allegiances were vague. ... National political organisations, such as they were, made only sporadic appeals to the laboring classes. For most of these years, the culxivation of the awakening class conscious­ness was left to the intellectuals. ...
The absence of direction was less important than the presence of discontent. The working classes in the North were rendered explosive by « variety of broad frustrations and particular grievances, all of which ... stemmed from the American System. ...^*
Here, in two adjoining paragraphs, stand two similar
and distinct terms* "laboring classes" and "working class”
— obviously intended to mean the same class of people. But
Schlesinger nowhere explains the early nineteenth century
meaning of these terms. Dorfman has, on the other hand, at
least attempted to give a partial conception of the meaning
of "workingmen" as part of his attacks on the Schlesinger
thesis. His explanation that "only the lazy idlers were not
honest workingmen,"14 however, seems too broad to determine
l%chlesinger, Jackson, p. 33. 
l^Dorfman, "Thesis," p. 305.
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the actual composition of the workingmen» This lack of 
definitions for certain pivotal terms bears important 
consequences on historical research. It leads to confusion 
rather than clarity,
II
"Did Labor Support Andrew Jackson? The Boston Story" 
by Edward Pessen, and "Did Labor Support Andrew Jackson?" by 
William Sullivan, both suggest a method in the use of 
election returns to measure the attitude of the populace 
toward Jackson and his Democratic party, Pessen has given 
us the election returns for all the presidential and state 
gubernatorial elections in Boston for the entire period 1828 
to 1836, and Sullivan has presented the labor vote in 
Philadelphia for approximately the same period. Since the 
latter does not provide any actual figures, discussion will 
be directed to Pessen*s alone.
The method Pessen has employed is to divide the 
electoral wards of Boston according to population and 
assessed valuation, and assume those wards with the lowest 
per capita figures were the working class wards. Then, by 
comparing the votes received, he has discovered that in no 
election did the working class wards in the city vote 
consistently for Jackson* There is no doubt that votes (in 
an honest election, with a secret ballot} can best reflect 
the opinion of the populace, but only if the statistics are
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used correctly. Unfortunately, Pessen has not subjected his 
raw data to statistical analysis. Robert Bower has done it 
for him.15
Since Boston was a predominantly pro-Whig city, the 
use of raw overall statistics, or the derivation of results 
from a perusal of these statistics, would be improper; 
indeed, it leads to specious conclusions. A sounder way of 
evaluating the workingmen's strength (still using Pessen*s 
division of wards by assessed valuation) should take into 
consideration the relative size of the vote in correlation 
with the socio-economic factors of the wards concerned.
Bower has applied this easy statistical method. The 
election returns in Boston from 1828 to 1336, including the 
three presidential elections, according to Bower, clearly 
point out that there was a general tendency of the working 
class wards to give more support to Jackson and/or his 
Democratic party.
To facilitate discussion two tables showing the 
correlation coefficients, obtained from Pessen*# raw data, 
for both the presidential and the state gubernatorial 
elections for the period 1828 to 1836 are listed below;l&
5̂ftobert I. Bower, "Note on 'Did Labor Support Jackson?: 
The Boston Story,*" Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 65 





















The first table indicates a slight increase of 
correlation for the presidential elections of 1828 and 1832; 
then a significant rise in the correlation figure in 1836.
The second table shows that there was a steadily increasing 
correlation from .30 for the election of 1829 to ,70 for that 
of 1835. Thus, analysis of the vote indicates that there was 
a distinct trend toward voting Democratic in the working 
class wards, even though Boston wa$ then the stronghold of 
the Whig party. By this evidence, therefore. Bower cannot 
agree with Pessen*s conclusion that "Andrew Jackson ... was 
not supported at the polls by the workingmen, and it was not
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until the add-thirties, at the very end of his second term, 
that his party was able to win a small majority in any of 
the working class wards."!?
Ill
Richard B, Morris, in his analysis of a single labor 
incident on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal for which President 
Jackson called out federal troops, has drawn certain 
presumptions which, however, do not necessarily warrant his 
conclusion that Jackson was not a friend of labor but a 
protector of business.
The facts, used by Morris, are rather scarce, 
inaccurate, obscure, and sometimes contradictory. For 
example, in reporting the cause of labor dispute, Niles' 
Weekly Register records that "the cause of the outrage is 
supposed to be some dissatisfaction about pay," The 
Hagerstown Torchlight attributes "the cause of the diffi­
culty" to "either the suspension of work, or of payment, on 
one or more sections of the canal." Neither paper seems to 
have ascertained the real causes of the dispute. Yet, when 
quoting the source from the Register. Morris has sloughed 
off the words "supposed to be," and arbitrarily compared the 
incident to a "labor grievance," jurisdictional strike," 
or conflict for a "closed shop."18
!?Pessen, "Jackson; Boston," p. 274. 
!®Morris, "Strikebreaker," p. 55.
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Thus, it is surprising that the subsequent peace 
agreement made between the two contending parties contains 
no reference to wage, hour, or other economic grievances 
which would nominally constitute a labor strike. The agree­
ment readsÎ
We agree ... that we will not ..• interrupt 
any person engaged on the canal, for ... a 
local difference or national prejudice, and 
that we will use our influence to destroy 
all these matters of difference growing out 
of this distinction of parties. ...1?
Indeed, it is quite clear that there Is no evidence whatso­
ever contained in this agreement, which would support 
Morris’s contention that it is "perfectly clear" that the 
conflict was "provoked by serious labor grievances."20
Indeed, it seems probable that the dispute was the 
result of either irresponsible gang riots or more probably 
ethnic feuding between two antagonistic groups. The Irish 
laborers came from a land where sectional feuds were 
traditional. It would be a rather commonplace occurrence 
if one group of them should establish a sphere of interest 
against the other strictly on an ethnic basis. But this 
action can hardly be explained, as Morris tries to do, as 
being absolutely motivated by economic grievances which 




Following this interpretation, Morris concludes hi#
article with these remarksî
But this much is clear, Jackson’s action should 
remove any lingering doubt about his concern 
with the problems of industrial labor. •••
Perhaps the workmen of Jackson’s own day had a 
clearer knowledge of this fact than later 
historians who painted the President as the 
darling of the "toiling class."21
What Morris has stated here amounts to this; Because 
of Jackson’s action of sending in federal troops to suppress 
a labor disturbance, all the workers then necessarily 
perceived him as a strikebreaker. As a strikebreaker, 
Jackson is necessarily antagonistic to the working class.
This is not a sound deduction. A person who, for example, 
advocates birth control is not necessarily anti-Catholic.
What was the reaction of labor as a result of Jackson’s 
being a strikebreaker? Any statement about the worker’s 
image of Jackson must be based upon empirical rather than 
logic grounds. Morris has not produced any data to support 
his contention.
IV
Since the publication of Schlesinger’s The Age of 
Jackson, a tremendous interest has been aroused in that era 
of American history. One would think that this new interest, 
coupled with new data, would result in a better
21Jbld., pp. 67-68.
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understanding of the relation of Eastern labor to the 
rampant democratic upheaval in the course of the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, however, this is 
not so.
Several reasons contribute to and serve to explain
this failure to obtain clarity. The most salient ones are:
(1) the lack of definition in regard to the pivotal terms
under discussion, such as "labor" and "business;" (2) hard
crystallization of the lines of interpretation, 1. e.*
either violently pro or anti Schlesinger; (3) the use of
faulty or inadequate method of historical analysis, as
pointed out in Bower’s critique of Pessen.
If these obstacles were removed, possibly new
interpretation of the Jacksonian era might emerge, which has
this hypothesis* The Jacksonian period is one in which a
portion of the business community allied with the Eastern
laborers in their common struggle against the domination of
the monopolistic groups in government. It is interesting
that a non-professional historian, Bray Hammond, has adopted
this sensible concept.
Bray Hammond has pointed out:
There was no more important factor in the 
Jacksonian movement than the democratization 
of business, which ceased henceforth to be a 
metier of predominantly mercantile, exclusive 
group, or commercial aristocracy, as it was
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in the days of Hamilton, and became an interest 
of common man. This process of democratization 
went hand in hand with the rise of laissez-faire. 22
The eighteen-twenties were a decade of discontent, 
born in depression and shaken by bursts of violence and 
threats of rebellion. The depression of 1819 awide people 
desperate. Farmers, especially those on worn-out lands, 
found themselves poorer at the end of a year of labor than 
at the beginning. Workingmen suffered wage cuts and 
unemployment, small businessmen found it increasingly 
difficult to maintain their old independence and security; 
in countless cases they lost their homes on mortgage fore­
closures or were thrown into jail for debt. The unfocused 
disquietude of the multitudes, who had been left behind in 
the race for wealth, was turning into active resentment.
Jackson*s mandate was to restrict the menacing 
construction of federal and corporate power, and restore the 
wholesome rule of "public opinion and the interests of 
trade."23 There were two Jacksonian goalst a laissez-faire 
movement in the economic realm, and a campaign of the poor 
and propertyless classes against the rich and privileged 
classes in the social realm.
^̂ Hanunond, "Bank," p. 82.
23Requoted from Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion. 
(Stanford, 1957), p. 18.
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Among all the exclusive privileged monopolies in the
country, the Bank of the United States was the largest, the
best-known and the most powerful. It was castigated by
farmers and workers as well as the shopkeepers. One
certain accomplishment of Jackson's war on the Bank was to
discharge the aggressions of citizens who felt injured by
economic privileges.
In his Bank Veto message Jackson declares:
It is to be regretted that the rich and power­
ful too often bend the acts of government to 
their selfish purposes. Distinctions in 
society will always exist under every just 
government. Equality of talents, of 
education, or of wealth cannot be produced 
by human institutions. In the full enjoy­
ment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits 
of superior industry, economy, and virtue, 
every man is equally entitled to protection by law; ...24
What is demanded here is equality before the law, the 
restriction of government to the function of guaranteeing 
equal protection of its citizens. Its aim is not to 
throttle but to liberate business, to open every possible 
pathway for the creative enterprise of the people.
Jackson's hard money policy appealed not only to the 
workingmen, but benefited the small businessmen as well. 
Hammond has pointed out that the panic of 1837 was equally 
calamitous to businessmen as well as to laborers.
^^Requoted from Leopold and Link, ed.. Problems in American 
History. (New York, 1952), p. 267.
^^Hammond, "Bank," p. 82.
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In other words, for a period both the middle class 
entrepreneurs and the farmers and the workers united behind 
Jackson. Although **the honeymoon was brief," Hammond 
continues, "it had separated the corporate form of organiia* 
tion from monopoly ... and ... made banking a form of 
business free and open to all."26
Dorfman, in his critique of The Aoe of Jackson, 
asserts that abolition of imprisonment for debt was not an 
exclusive demand of labor; it was also desired by business 
circles of the time. He employs this evidence to refute 
Schlesinger*8 emphasis on labor alone. But Dorfman fails 
to see that a given reform may be functional for more than 
one group; it may, under given conditions, be functional 
at the same time for two groups nominally conceived as 
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